Abstract: Achieving exemplary safety performance requires more than attention to systems and procedures. More and more companies are pursuing culture change as the key to delivering and sustaining safety improvement. In order to achieve culture change, it is vital that the right issues are tackled, but culture is complex and it can be difficult to have confidence with regard to what is the right kind of intervention. This paper introduces an approach to safety climate assessment that has been developed to enable cost-effective assessment of an organisation. The tool that is described has also been used to track changes in safety climate, allowing improvement plans to be updated and refocused to maximise the effective use of resources. Some real examples of safety climate assessment and culture change in industry are reviewed.
Introduction

The Need for Change
The UK has one of the world's best records for health and safety. Nevertheless, in the year 2003/2004 (April to April), there were 235 fatal injuries to workers, almost the same as during the previous year (HSE, 2004) . Further, the fatal injury rate to employees was the same Looking at the manufacturing sector in isolation, the most recent HSE statistics appear positive at first sight, showing that the rate of fatal injuries to workers is the lowest of any year over the period 1992/1993 to 2003/2004 . However, on closer inspection we see that this reduction is simply a low point on an undulating flat curve, and past experience suggests that the rate will rise before it reduces.
There can be no doubt that the legislative and societal pressures on businesses have increased substantially over the past ten years. The introduction of major pieces of legislation such as COMAH, coupled with debate concerning the personal responsibility that senior managers should bear for their organisations' safety management failures, have served to focus businesses' attention on safety and increasingly to build within organisations an awareness of the need to build an accident-free workplace.
It is therefore appropriate to ask why it is that national safety performance has not improved in recent years.
The influence of organisational culture on safety performance has been a subject of debate and research for a long time. What is clear is that high-performing organisations share some common cultural features (HSE, 2000) , and that safety performance improvement can be achieved through cultural change. Some organisations have grasped the opportunity and have achieved very high levels of safety performance, with tens of millions of accident-free working hours. Behavioural-based safety programmes have achieved popularity and are seen as part of the solution to safety culture problems. At the same time, as witnessed by the HSE's data, underlying problems remain and many organisations fail to manage safety in an acceptable fashion.
Taylor (2002) has characterised three phases of safety performance change:
Phase 1 "Accidents go with the job"
Phase 2 Dramatic improvement Phase 3 Roller-coaster phase These phases reflect a transition from fatalism with regard to safety risks and failures, via a period of focused improvement on well-defined issues, to a plateau of lower but non-zero accident levels. At each stage there are cultural challenges. The challenge at one end of the spectrum is to change mindsets and help organisations see that safe working is achievable -thereby enabling them to drive rapid improvement. At the other end, the challenge is to break out of the roller-coaster zone of fluctuating safety performance. The roller-coaster is really an indication that safety performance is not entirely under control, and that a new approach is needed to bring about improvement. Taylor has termed the residual safety performance gap "the culture gap" -which must be closed by achieving greater commitment, involvement and ownership of safety by all employees within an organisation, led from the top.
The HSE's data are indicative of a safety culture problem, but the particular cultural shortfall cannot be identified from the overview data; what is clear is that organisations need a better grasp of where their organisations' cultures are healthy and where they are not if they are to achieve improvement.
Building Improvement
There is a very obvious moral imperative that can drive individuals to seek to eliminate accidents from the workplace. In addition, organisations that decide to improve safety performance may choose to do so for reasons such as the following:
• They may aspire to achieve exemplary performance because it reflects well on them personally or in the eyes of their stakeholders, or because poor performance would be incompatible with their business purpose
• They may simply respond to the threat of prosecution
• They may believe that, as "just another" aspect of business performance, a more safe business should be a more profitable business
The HSE has certainly indicated that the costs of incidents and accidents can be substantial, detracting from profitability and taking up resources that might more usefully be directed elsewhere.
The path that businesses engaged in safety performance improvement follow typically involves the wellestablished elements of:
• Implementation of technical / physical / engineering controls (which can be seen as driven largely by standards, recognised good practice and legislation)
• Establishment of a safety management system to provide a framework in which safety can be managed
•
Safety improvement through people
Many organisations within the UK would consider themselves to have good technical / physical / engineering controls and management systems. They are now seeking to achieve the engagement and involvement of their people in bringing about further improvement, and improve their level of control of safety performance beyond Taylor's "roller-coaster".
The Position of Safety Culture
Technical / physical / engineering controls and safety management systems are important, but it is insufficient to provide safe equipment, systems and procedures if the culture is not conducive to safe working (IOSH, 2004 ). The precise meaning of safety culture is somewhat elusive, but it has been defined (Uttal, 1983) There is nothing that makes safety improvement different from any other aspect of business performance improvement, but safety has to be seen as an achievable business requirement as much as the manufacture of profitable components or tonnes of product -and this is the real cultural challenge.
As with any improvement process, an assessment of the current situation is essential to provide the basis of a plan, and this has led to the development of safety climate assessment tools to gauge the prevailing attitudes to safety within organisations. The HSE has reviewed a number of such tools (HSE, 1999 ) dating back to the mid-'90s and based on paper or computer spreadsheet-based questionnaires.
Use of these typically requires a respondent to answer between c 40 and c 300 questions, typically on a Likert scale (eg ranging from "Agree strongly" to "Disagree strongly"), addressing the cultural characteristics identified above. Completed questionnaires are then returned for formal analysis. Such approaches have been used in the offshore and nuclear industries (Lee, Mearns et al) . The assessment can be delivered as paper hardcopy with the results collated by hand, or electronically with the results collated automatically. The latter approach has been used to deliver assessment internationally at remote locations.
The quantitative data generated from a climate assessment provide a useful indication of where an organisation's strengths and weaknesses may lie. But, we have found that quantitative data alone are insufficient to make an accurate diagnosis of the cultural issues that an organisation faces, and we believe that it is essential to speak to a company's employees face-to-face to understand why they feel as they do. The quantitative data may point to where there is an issue, but they do not indicate why or exactly what the issue is. We therefore recommend the following approach:
• All personnel are asked to complete an assessment questionnaire, whether in hardcopy form
or by e-mail
• We carry out a targeted structured interview programme with a subset of the workforce. The questionnaire is completed and the answers discussed with the group. This interview programme is best led by a specialist in people change and with a knowledge of industry best practice
The questionnaire itself provides the structure for the interview programme, and the quantitative data already gathered can be used to help drive discussion. The interviews focus on the interviewees' experiences and observations that have informed their views. Depending upon the size and nature of the organisation, we have interviewed from 10% to 20% of the workforce, representing a cross-section of the company's employees. Data gathered in the first phase of the assessment both allow the interview group to be more effectively targeted, and allow areas of particular interest to be identified in advance of the interviews.
The interview programme embraces:
• Senior management
•
Middle management
• First line managers and supervisors
Senior manager interviews are usually carried out one-to-one, and those with front-line personnel, eg process operators, are usually carried out in groups of between three and six, to encourage discussion.
In the latter case, one copy of the questionnaire is completed jointly by the group. We have found a high level of congruence between questionnaires completed by groups in interview with those completed remotely by personnel who have not been interviewed.
The safety climate assessment therefore generates:
• A quantitative picture of the safety climate
• A qualitative understanding of the issues that underly the quantitative picture
In making a case for change, the quantitative results serve to highlight the areas in which there are issues, and the qualitative data enable possible underlying reasons to be identified. It is of course this qualitative understanding, reviewed against a knowledge of best practice, that provides the basis for defining the required improvement plan.
The Overall Change Process
Safety climate assessment is one step of a larger process to bring about safety performance improvement. The overall approach that is taken is termed B-SHARP TM 1 and is shown in Figure 1 below. Safety climate assessment itself is only part of the initial diagnosis. A knowledge of safety performance and the nature and root causes of accidents and incidents is also essential, before carrying out the interview programme. At the same time it is important to understand a business's safety management system and structure, especially with regard to management responsibilities, and its arrangements for driving improvement.
Following completion of the climate assessment, we facilitate a planning event with the site or business senior team to build a shared understanding of the current safety climate and issues that have been identified through the assessment. The team reviews this understanding against the business's needs and aspirations, and generates a high level plan for change, linked directly back to the gaps uncovered in the climate assessment.
Depending upon the issues to be tackled, delivery of change may involve some or all of the following:
• Clarifying roles, responsibilities and accountabilities backing for safety improvement at key decision-making levels, because the workplace culture is not sufficiently mature to support a behavioural programme, or because there would simply be more benefit to be gained from tackling hardware and procedural issues; in the last case, however, involvement of the workforce is not precluded, indeed this is a classic area for a shopfloor-based improvement team.
The essence of Continuous Improvement is "Plan, Do, Review", and safety climate change can be monitored on a continuing basis to enable a progress review. The benefit of this is that the impact of the delivery programme can be tracked, and the plan revised to take account of the organisation's changing safety perceptions and needs. An example of this is presented in the first case study, below.
As indicated, safety improvement can involve the use of behavioural approaches, and we have developed an approach termed Behavioural Safety Auditing. The Behavioural Safety Auditing System (BSAS) is a technique designed to promote discussion of safety in the workplace through the observation of safe and unsafe acts and conditions. The focus of this type of audit, also referred to as a zero accidents, if ever, and it needed to do something different if it was to achieve the step change in safety performance that it desired. The business therefore decided to complete a safety climate assessment so as to get a different perspective on the challenges it faced, and to allow it to focus effort where it would have greatest and quickest impact.
MWKL operates internationally, in a number of different locations, with its sites having potentially many different cultural issues. An approach was needed that:
• Could be completed for each location, quickly and cost-effectively
The views of the workforce needed to be gathered to understand the culture properly, but it was impractical to interview large numbers. An electronic remote survey process was therefore developed.
This allowed:
• An initial picture of the safety climate within MWKL to be constructed very quickly
• Areas of opportunity to be targeted for improvement
• An appropriate cross-section of the workforce to be identified for interview whilst also minimising the need for time-consuming and costly overseas travel.
The B-SHARP TM questionnaire was delivered via email to 1700 employees in six countries, with a return rate of 54%. Broad themes were identified from the data, and a sample of employees subsequently interviewed to explore the underlying reasons behind the responses. • Build workforce ownership of safety (through a programme of workshops for all employees)
• Establish and communicate required management behaviours (including use of a performance review process setting safety-related objectives for all personnel)
• Review and clarify management responsibilities MWKL subsequently rolled-out across the organisation a workshop programme to raise safety awareness and gain buy-in to shared ownership and responsibility for safety. The impact of these actions was seen in an increase in the numbers of near-misses reported, increased involvement of personnel in auditing activities, along with a continued zero lost time injury performance. Using these data, the existing improvement plan was updated to address:
• Management responsibility and clarity, focusing on middle and senior management 
Introduction of a Behavioural Safety Programme
In addition to its consultancy business, ABB operates a number of manufacturing sites in the UK, and is placing considerable emphasis on driving forward safety improvement at these locations. In the UK, the business is aligning its Occupational Health and Safety Management System with the requirements of OHSAS 18001, and plans to make increasing use of behavioural approaches to safety. The approach taken has allowed the workforce itself to select those behaviours that it sees as critical,
and at which the audits should be targeted. Our approach to generating this list of critical behaviours is to review incidents, risk assessments and personal experience with the Audit Management Team using a mapping process to highlight critical areas and so draw out critical behaviours and the personal protective equipment (PPE) requirements to be audited. Subsequent training of the BSAS auditor team involves formal classroom training, role-play and hands-on experience in the workplace.
Initial output from the BSAS audit monitoring package is shown in Figure 4 . This shows that the majority of unsafe acts were connected with personal protective equipment (PPE) and job methods, i.e. noncompliance with PPE requirements and established job methods, and served to drive the initial improvement actions. A "safe working" measure, derived from the number and severity of unsafe acts observed is also calculated and displayed (see Figure 5 ). This indicates that most unsafe acts were being carried out in the Main Assembly (1) area, allowing improvement resource as well as BSAS audit effort to be targeted. was witnessed by reduced hand injuries. The behaviour of the workforce with regard to the BSAS audits had also changed; they no longer waited until an audit was carried out before tackling issues, and had become more proactive with regard to safety. Such climate assessment need not be onerous however; it is our experience that an assessment for a reasonably large site (a few hundred people) can be completed within one to two weeks. It is important that workforce expectations are not raised inappropriately by carrying out an assessment, and that the senior team at the site is committed to acting upon any shortfalls identified; this does have implications for the timing of any assessment. Safety culture is complex, and safety culture change requires time. All organisations have different cultural circumstances, and the appropriate intervention should be selected with care, taking account of where the organisation is in its cultural development.
The Behavioural Safety Auditing System (BSAS) generates data that can be used to drive safety improvement day-to-day, providing a system for capture and resolution of safety-related actions. BSAS maintains the involvement of the workforce, and can be used to provide a leading indicator of safety performance. In the example presented in this paper, BSAS has been written into the site's OHSAS 18001 implementation and is a cornerstone of its approach to continuous improvement in safety. Again, timing of BSAS introduction is critical; if a behavioural safety programme is launched too soon, it may lack the support of the area management or the workforce, and risks failing. A BSAS programme can generate large numbers of improvement actions, which have to be seen to be acted upon in order to maintain workforce commitment. If too many engineering and procedural issues are identified, the business may be unable to resource and resolve them quickly enough to maintain the programme's credibility in the eyes of the workforce. In these circumstances, it may be better to take an improvement team approach, providing a small group with the resources to improve the working environment in a more selective and focused way. This will raise the profile of safety, and can be a precursor to a broader-based behavioural safety programme.
